Further results on dictatorial domains

DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0889-0zbMath1341.91074OpenAlexW1997562102WikidataQ125373827 ScholiaQ125373827MaRDI QIDQ892849

Anup Pramanik

Publication date: 12 November 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/27702

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

Dictatorship on top-circular domains ⋮ Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model ⋮ Evaluationwise strategy-proofness ⋮ A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains ⋮ Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information ⋮ Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains ⋮ A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting ⋮ Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions

Cites Work

• Tops-only domains
• Circular domains
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Dictatorial domains
• On the alternating use of ``unanimity and ``surjectivity in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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