Recommendations
Cites work
- Circular domains
- Dictatorial domains
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On the alternating use of ``unanimity and ``surjectivity in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Tops-only domains
Cited in
(14)- A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
- A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
- Dictatorship on top-circular domains
- Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
- Dictatorial domains
- A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
- A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions
- A new view on Arrovian dictatorship in a fuzzy setting
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains
- Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
- A quasi-stability result for dictatorships in \(S_n\)
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