Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
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Publication:2049488
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.06.007zbMATH Open1470.91102OpenAlexW3183132636MaRDI QIDQ2049488FDOQ2049488
Authors: Michele Gori 
Publication date: 25 August 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.007
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Pareto optimalitystrategy-proofnessanonymitygroup strategy-proofnesssocial choice functionmanipulability
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Logics in Artificial Intelligence
- Dictatorial domains
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
- The proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem revisited
- Further results on dictatorial domains
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting.
- An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- A stability property in social choice theory
- Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
Cited In (7)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Social choice mechanism under complete information
- Strategic behavior under complete ignorance: approval and Condorcet-type voting rules
- Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
- Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
- Corrigendum to: ``Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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