Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103 (Why is no real title available?)
- A stability property in social choice theory
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
- Dictatorial domains
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- Further results on dictatorial domains
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Logics in Artificial Intelligence
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
- Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting.
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
- The proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem revisited
- When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
Cited in
(7)- Social choice mechanism under complete information
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5018131 (Why is no real title available?)
- Strategic behavior under complete ignorance: approval and Condorcet-type voting rules
- Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
- Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
- Corrigendum to: ``Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2182815 (Why is no real title available?)
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