A stability property in social choice theory
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3902605 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Cited in
(7)- Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3997489 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
- The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
- Hyper-stable collective rankings
- Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
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