A stability property in social choice theory
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Publication:4584864
DOI10.1111/ijet.12141zbMath1398.91242OpenAlexW2791216634MaRDI QIDQ4584864
Donald E. Campbell, Shaofang Qi, Jerry S. Kelly
Publication date: 4 September 2018
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12141
Related Items
Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence, Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
Cites Work
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