A stability property in social choice theory

DOI10.1111/IJET.12141zbMATH Open1398.91242OpenAlexW2791216634MaRDI QIDQ4584864FDOQ4584864

Authors: Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly, Shaofang Qi 

Publication date: 4 September 2018

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12141

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zbMATH Keywords

ParetostabilitymaximinmonotonicitypluralityCondorcetdictatorshiptops-onlyBorda

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population

Cited In (7)

• Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
• The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
• Hyper-stable collective rankings
• Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
• Social Stability and Equilibrium

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