A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
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Publication:1943447
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.001zbMath1282.91097OpenAlexW2067509296MaRDI QIDQ1943447
Publication date: 20 March 2013
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.001
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