Recommendations
Cites work
- A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- A unifying impossibility theorem
- Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
- Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3405712 (Why is no real title available?)
- Information and preference aggregation
- On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem
- On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem when individual preferences are weak orders
- Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity
- Social aggregators
- Social choice and individual values
- Social Choice with Interpersonal Utility Comparisons: A Diagrammatic Introduction
- The independence condition in the theory of social choice
- Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Twitching weak dictators
- Unifying impossibility theorems: A topological approach
Cited in
(6)- An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
- Stable preference aggregation with infinite population
- The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population
- Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population
- A decomposition of strategy-proofness
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