Bounded response of aggregated preferences
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Publication:306731
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.04.006zbMath1368.91079OpenAlexW2346342679MaRDI QIDQ306731
Publication date: 1 September 2016
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.04.006
independence of irrelevant alternativesArrow's impossibility theorembounded responsesocial welfare function
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A decomposition of strategy-proofness, Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population, An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions, The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population
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