An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
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Cites work
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- A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
- Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
- Bounded response of aggregated preferences
- Circular domains
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- Fixed agenda social choice theory: Correspondence and impossibility theorems for social choice correspondences and social decision functions
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
- Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice
- Voting and group decision functions
- Voting by Committees
- Voting systems that combine approval and preference
- When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
Cited in
(6)- Bounded response of aggregated preferences
- Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- Uniform random dictatorship: a characterization without strategy-proofness
- Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model
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