Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model

DOI10.1007/S00355-023-01491-1MaRDI QIDQ6541015zbMATHFDO

Authors Sarvesh Bandhu, Abhinaba Lahiri, Anup Pramanik

Publication date 17 May 2024

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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