Decomposing random mechanisms
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3121293 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3172312 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078983 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
- An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
- Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Integer Programming and Arrovian Social Welfare Functions
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
- Probabilistic Social Choice Based on Simple Voting Comparisons
- Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Random dictatorship domains
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
- Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
- The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
- When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
Cited in
(21)- On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
- On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
- A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Constrained random matching
- On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
- Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
- Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
- The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains
- Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- Random dictatorship domains
- Formation of committees through random voting rules
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- A decomposition of strategy-proofness
- A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
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