House allocation with existing tenants
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Publication:1809490
DOI10.1006/JETH.1999.2553zbMATH Open0939.91068OpenAlexW1995219873MaRDI QIDQ1809490FDOQ1809490
Authors: Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Tayfun Sönmez 
Publication date: 25 November 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2553
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- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
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