House allocation with existing tenants

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2553zbMath0939.91068OpenAlexW1995219873MaRDI QIDQ1809490

Publication date: 25 November 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2553

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proof Pareto efficient house allocation problems individually rational

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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