The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_14MaRDI QIDQ2152118zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ildikó Schlotter, Péter Biró, Tamás Fleiner

Publication date 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.06875

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Recommendations

• Shapley-Scarf housing markets: respecting improvement, integer programming, and kidney exchange
• Housing markets through graphs
• Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets
• The core for housing markets with limited externalities
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5697111

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5049926 (Why is no real title available?)
• A generalization of the stable matching problem
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Algorithms and Computation
• An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
• Circular stable matching and 3-way kidney transplant
• Computational complexity of stable partitions with b-preferences
• Dynamic kidney exchange
• Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
• Efficient algorithms for generalized stable marriage and roommates problems
• Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
• House allocation with existing tenants
• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
• Kidney Exchange
• Markovian assignment rules
• Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
• Maximum weight cycle packing in directed graphs, with application to kidney exchange programs
• On cores and indivisibility
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• Residence exchange wanted: A stable residence exchange problem
• Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability
• Stability in coalition formation games
• Stable marriage and roommates problems with restricted edges: complexity and approximability
• The circular chromatic number of a digraph
• The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
• The kidney exchange problem: how hard is it to find a donor?
• The stable marriage problem with restricted pairs.
• Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(2)

• Top trading cycles
• Shapley-Scarf housing markets: respecting improvement, integer programming, and kidney exchange

This page was built for publication: The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2152118)