The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_14OpenAlexW4206055328MaRDI QIDQ2152118FDOQ2152118

Authors: Ildikó Schlotter, Péter Biró, Tamás Fleiner 

Publication date: 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.06875

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

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Cited In (1)

• Top trading cycles

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