Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
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Publication:2857546
DOI10.3982/ECTA10570zbMath1274.91334OpenAlexW2115897852MaRDI QIDQ2857546
Tayfun Sönmez, Tobias B. Switzer
Publication date: 4 November 2013
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10570
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