Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
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Publication:2857546
Recommendations
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1996481
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- Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
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- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
- Blockers and antiblockers of stable matchings
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- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
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