Cumulative offer process is order-independent

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.008zbMath1295.91073OpenAlexW2063300047MaRDI QIDQ741313

Daisuke Hirata, Yusuke Kasuya

Publication date: 11 September 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.008

zbMATH Keywords

matching with contractsirrelevance of rejected contractscumulative offer processbilateral substitutability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

A cumulative offer process for supply chain networks, The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism, Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result, Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms, Unilateral substitutability is necessary for doctor-optimal stability, On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts, Characterizations of the cumulative offer process, Some further properties of the cumulative offer process, Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets, Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers, Dynamic reserves in matching markets

Cites Work

• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage