Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2206798
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.005zbMath1452.91221arXiv1812.10326OpenAlexW3039766616MaRDI QIDQ2206798
Publication date: 26 October 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.10326
strategy-proofnesssubstitutesdeferred acceptancematching with contractscollege admissionobservable substitutes
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- Cumulative offer process is order-independent
- Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- WARP and combinatorial choice
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
This page was built for publication: Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
