Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1958950
Recommendations
- Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
- The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations
- On relationships between substitutes conditions
- Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
- Unilateral substitutability is necessary for doctor-optimal stability
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
- Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
- Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- On a characterization of stable matchings
- On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
- Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
Cited in
(74)- The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
- Unilateral substitutability is necessary for doctor-optimal stability
- Graduate admission with financial support
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
- Restricted complementarity and paths to stability in matching with couples
- Matching with nonexclusive contracts
- Lone wolves in competitive equilibria
- A cumulative offer process for supply chain networks
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations
- On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
- Rationalizable choice functions
- Matching with partially ordered contracts
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
- WARP and combinatorial choice
- On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
- Testing substitutability
- Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand
- Matching With Complementary Contracts
- A college admissions clearinghouse
- Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
- Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts
- Stable matching: An integer programming approach
- The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
- Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets
- Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
- Binary operations for the lattice structure in a many-to-many matching model
- Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts
- Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets
- Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
- Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
- Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
- Conditional stable matchings
- Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
- Corrigendum to: ``Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
- Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- Partitionable choice functions and stability
- Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- School choice with hybrid schedules
- Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain
- Job matching with subsidy and taxation
- Generalized cumulative offer processes
- Matching through institutions
- Matching with property rights: an application to Korean teacher transfer program
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
- Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
- Purchasing seats in school choice and inequality
- Allocation with weak priorities and general constraints
- On the number of employed in the matching model
- Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
- On relationships between substitutes conditions
- On the contracts between doctors and rural hospitals
- Stability vs. no justified envy
- Characterizations of the cumulative offer process
- Cumulative offer process is order-independent
- A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
- Equivalences between two matching models: stability
- Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
- Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
This page was built for publication: Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1958950)
