Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.007zbMath1245.91068OpenAlexW2161153180MaRDI QIDQ1958950

John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima

Publication date: 30 September 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.007

zbMATH Keywords

latticestabilitymatchingstrategy-proofnesssubstitutesmatching with contractslaw of aggregate demandgroup strategy-proofnessbilateral substitutesunilateral substitutesrural hospitals theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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