Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples
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Publication:840696
Recommendations
- Corrigendum to: ``Two-sided matching problems with externalities
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Cites work
Cited in
(14)- Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Corrigendum to: ``Two-sided matching problems with externalities
- Preference aggregation for couples
- Corrigendum to: ``Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
- Corrigendum to ``Multilateral matching
- Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
- The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
- Restricted complementarity and paths to stability in matching with couples
- Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints
- Matching markets with farsighted couples
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Couples can be tractable: new algorithms and hardness results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples
- Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples
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