Preference aggregation for couples

DOI10.1007/S00355-022-01413-7MaRDI QIDQ2103590zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rouzbeh Ghouchani, Szilvia Pápai

Publication date 9 December 2022

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01413-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Labor markets (91B39)

Recommendations

• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
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• Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
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Cites work

• Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core
• Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings
• Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
• Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness
• Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem
• Social choice and individual values
• Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs

Cited in

(1)

• Arbiter assignment

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