Preference aggregation for couples
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Publication:2103590
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Cites work
- Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core
- Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings
- Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
- Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness
- Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem
- Social choice and individual values
- Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs
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