Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)

DOI10.1007/S10058-006-0017-9MaRDI QIDQ2463787zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn, Jordi Massó

Publication date 6 December 2007

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://ddd.uab.cat/record/143511

zbMATH Keywords

couplesmatchingstability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• NP-complete stable matching problems
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics

Cited in

(16)

• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Preference aggregation for couples
• Matching with partners and projects
• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
• Fair and efficient student placement with couples
• Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
• Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm
• Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: an experimental study
• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
• The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
• Stable matching with couples: an empirical study
• Matching with sizes (or scheduling with processing set restrictions)
• Matching markets with farsighted couples
• Agreement toward stability in matching markets
• Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
• Finding all stable matchings with couples

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