Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: an experimental study

DOI10.3982/QE496zbMATH Open1396.91567OpenAlexW1523356591MaRDI QIDQ4586263FDOQ4586263

Authors: Federico Echenique, Alistair J. Wilson, Leeat Yariv 

Publication date: 12 September 2018

Published in: Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/qe496

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zbMATH Keywords

stabilitydeferred acceptanceexperimentscentralized matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)

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