Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.009zbMath1419.91530OpenAlexW3123853296WikidataQ129248992 ScholiaQ129248992MaRDI QIDQ1735739

Marc Vorsatz, Flip Klijn, Joana Pais

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/201961

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityefficiencydeferred acceptancedynamic school choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Decentralized college admissions under single application, Parallel markets in school choice, Menu mechanisms, The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism, Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis, Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles, Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets, Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm, Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab, Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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