Constrained school choice
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Publication:840677
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Cites work
- A comment on ``School choice: an experimental study [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Constrained school choice
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria
- House allocation with existing tenants
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- On cores and indivisibility
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Random matching in the college admissions problem
- Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
- School choice: an experimental study
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted
- Competitive equilibria in school assignment
- Serial dictatorship and unmatch reduction: a problem of Japan's nursery school choice
- Incompatibility between stability and consistency
- Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- Epsilon-stability in school choice
- Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
- School choice with vouchers
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences
- Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
- Level-k reasoning in school choice
- Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
- School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms
- On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms
- Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice
- College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse
- What you don't know can help you in school assignment
- University rankings from the revealed preferences of the applicants
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions
- High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis
- Manipulability in school choice
- The medium-run efficiency consequences of unfair school matching: evidence from Chinese college admissions
- Self-selection in school choice
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
- Optimizing reserves in school choice: a dynamic programming approach
- Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism
- On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice
- Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
- The modified Boston mechanism
- Matching and chatting: an experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms
- Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
- School choice with neighbors
- A dynamic school choice model
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- School choice: an experimental study
- A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof
- Making just school assignments
- Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
- Criteria to compare mechanisms that partially satisfy a property: an axiomatic study
- School choice with preference rank classes
- Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- Improving community cohesion in school choice via correlated-lottery implementation
- Controlled school choice with soft bounds and overlapping types
- Lotteries in student assignment: an equivalence result
- School Choice with Consent*
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Mechanism design in school choice: some lessons in a nutshell
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
- Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice
- A theory of school-choice lotteries
- Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
- School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance
- Coalitions and cliques in the school choice problem
- (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
- The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
- Family ties: school assignment with siblings
- School choice under partial fairness
- Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
- Approximately stable, school optimal, and student-truthful many-to-one matchings (via differential privacy)
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
- New axioms for top trading cycles
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
- Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis
- A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism
- The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
- An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences
- Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: district-based versus school-based admissions
- Asymptotic Welfare Performance of Boston Assignment Algorithms
- The law of large numbers for large stable matchings
- The core of school choice problems
- Robustness to manipulations in school choice
- Capacity design in school choice
- A further note on the college admission game
- Sequential school choice with public and private schools
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