Constrained school choice
From MaRDI portal
Publication:840677
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.002zbMath1195.91034MaRDI QIDQ840677
Flip Klijn, Guillaume Haeringer
Publication date: 14 September 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2006/67106.pdf
stability; efficiency; matching; Nash equilibrium; school choice; Boston mechanism; top trading cycles; acyclic priority structure; Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm
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