Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
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Publication:800200
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90152-2zbMath0549.90006MaRDI QIDQ800200
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90152-2
stable outcomes; marriage problem; equilibrium misrepresentation; strategy-proof procedure for aggregating preferences; two-sided discrete markets
91B14: Social choice
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