Bipartite choices

DOI10.1007/S10203-022-00380-ZMaRDI QIDQ2105872zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marco LiCalzi

Publication date 8 December 2022

Published in Decisions in Economics and Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-022-00380-z

zbMATH Keywords

bipartite graphstable marriage problemtwo-sided matchingcollege admission problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

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Cited in

(2)

• Partially dominant choice
• Binary interactions and subset choice

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