Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings

DOI10.1016/0097-3165(84)90056-6zbMath0546.06009MaRDI QIDQ798345

N. E. Zubov

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Theory. Series A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0097-3165(84)90056-6

zbMATH Keywords

finite distributive lattice; stable matchings; preference ordering

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

06A06: Partial orders, general

05A05: Permutations, words, matrices

06D05: Structure and representation theory of distributive lattices

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Cites Work

• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage