Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings

DOI10.1016/0097-3165(84)90056-6zbMATH Open0546.06009OpenAlexW2001980959MaRDI QIDQ798345FDOQ798345

Authors: N. E. Zubov 

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Theory. Series A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0097-3165(84)90056-6

Recommendations

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zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingspreference orderingfinite distributive lattice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Permutations, words, matrices (05A05) Partial orders, general (06A06) Structure and representation theory of distributive lattices (06D05)

Cites Work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives

Cited In (31)

• Entering classes in the college admissions model
• The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
• Complexity of the sex-equal stable marriage problem
• Eccentricity, center and radius computations on the cover graphs of distributive lattices with applications to stable matchings
• Antimatroids induced by matchings
• Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
• Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
• Characterization of cores of assignment games
• Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings for a small stable marriage instance
• Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
• On the stable marriage polytope
• Stable matching: An integer programming approach
• Bipartite choices
• Understanding the generalized median stable matchings
• Employment by lotto revisited
• Center stable matchings and centers of cover graphs of distributive lattices
• The Generalized Median Stable Matchings: Finding Them Is Not That Easy
• Every finite distributive lattice is isomorphic to the minimizer set of an \(M^\natural \)-concave set function
• Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
• Linear programming brings marital bliss
• Counterexamples of small size for three-sided stable matching with cyclic preferences
• The presence of lattice theory in discrete problems of mathematical social sciences. Why.
• The diameter of the stable marriage polytope: bounding from below
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
• Stable matching in large economies
• A unifying approach to the structures of the stable matching problems
• The two-sided matching problem. Origin, development and current issues
• A counterexample of size 20 for the problem of finding a 3-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
• Coalescence on the real line
• Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
• Finding a Level Ideal of a Poset

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