Characterization of cores of assignment games

DOI10.1007/BF01766430zbMATH Open0728.90102MaRDI QIDQ805509FDOQ805509

Authors: Thomas Quint 

Publication date: 1991

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Assignment games with stable core
• Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games
• Assignment markets with the same core
• Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.
• Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game.

zbMATH Keywords

coreassignmentmarriage game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• The assignment game. I: The core
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings

Cited In (23)

• An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
• Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist
• Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods
• Assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property
• Assignment games with stable core
• On the dimension of the core of the assignment game
• Assignment markets that are uniquely determined by their core
• QUASI-ASSIGNMENT COOPERATIVE GAMES
• ASSIGNMENT SITUATIONS WITH MULTIPLE OWNERSHIP AND THEIR GAMES
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Cooperative assignment games with the inverse Monge property
• Operations research games: A survey. (With comments and rejoinder)
• Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.
• Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game.
• Assignment markets with the same core
• A survey on assignment markets
• The 'marriage game': An assignment problem with indivisibilities
• Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games
• On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game
• Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
• Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games
• Monotonic core allocation paths for assignment games
• Axiomatization of the core of assignment games

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