Characterization of cores of assignment games

DOI10.1007/BF01766430MaRDI QIDQ805509zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Thomas Quint

Publication date 1991

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01766430

zbMATH Keywords

assignmentcoremarriage game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Assignment games with stable core
• Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games
• Assignment markets with the same core
• Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.
• Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game.

Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
• The assignment game. I: The core

Cited in

(23)

• Operations research games: A survey. (With comments and rejoinder)
• Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game.
• Assignment games with stable core
• Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.
• An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
• Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games
• Monotonic core allocation paths for assignment games
• On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game
• Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games
• Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist
• ASSIGNMENT SITUATIONS WITH MULTIPLE OWNERSHIP AND THEIR GAMES
• Assignment markets that are uniquely determined by their core
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1999233 (Why is no real title available?)
• QUASI-ASSIGNMENT COOPERATIVE GAMES
• Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods
• Assignment markets with the same core
• Assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property
• Cooperative assignment games with the inverse Monge property
• The 'marriage game': An assignment problem with indivisibilities
• Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
• Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
• A survey on assignment markets
• On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

This page was built for publication: Characterization of cores of assignment games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q805509)