Characterization of cores of assignment games

DOI10.1007/BF01766430MaRDI QIDQ805509zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Thomas Quint

Publication date 1991

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01766430

zbMATH Keywords

assignmentcoremarriage game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Review text

The assignment or marriage game is a coalition game whose players are divided into two groups and in which only two-players disjoint coalitions which are elements of the Cartesian product of the two groups are admitted. It is shown in the paper under review that the core of such games is always a special type of lattice and, on the other hand, every lattice of the considered type is the core of some assignment game.

Recommendations

• Assignment games with stable core
• Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games
• Assignment markets with the same core
• Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.
• Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game.

Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
• The assignment game. I: The core

Cited in

(23)

• Operations research games: A survey. (With comments and rejoinder)
• Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game.
• Assignment games with stable core
• Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.
• An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
• Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games
• Monotonic core allocation paths for assignment games
• On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game
• Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games
• Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist
• ASSIGNMENT SITUATIONS WITH MULTIPLE OWNERSHIP AND THEIR GAMES
• Assignment markets that are uniquely determined by their core
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1999233 (Why is no real title available?)
• QUASI-ASSIGNMENT COOPERATIVE GAMES
• Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods
• Assignment markets with the same core
• Assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property
• Cooperative assignment games with the inverse Monge property
• The 'marriage game': An assignment problem with indivisibilities
• Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
• Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
• A survey on assignment markets
• On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

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