Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00054-XzbMath1072.91007MaRDI QIDQ1408713

Carles Rafels, Marina Núñez

Publication date: 25 September 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

convex gamesassignment gameextreme core allocationsreduced marginal worth vectors

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (14)

Population monotonicity in matching games ⋮ Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities ⋮ A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market ⋮ From the bankruptcy problem and its concede-and-divide solution to the assignment problem and its fair division solution ⋮ On a class of vertices of the core ⋮ On the set of extreme core allocations for minimal cost spanning tree problems ⋮ A survey on assignment markets ⋮ Assignment markets with the same core ⋮ Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game? ⋮ Hyperadditive games and applications to networks or matching problems ⋮ Median stable matching for markets with wages ⋮ Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods ⋮ Monotonic core allocation paths for assignment games ⋮ The boundary of the core of a balanced game: face games

Cites Work

• Assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
• On extreme points of the core and reduced games
• Assignment games with stable core
• Cores of convex games
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The kernel of a cooperative game
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