Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game?
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Publication:2241239
DOI10.1007/s10479-020-03576-xzbMath1475.91108OpenAlexW3013900152MaRDI QIDQ2241239
Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, Elisabeth Gutierrez, Natividad Llorca, Rodica Branzei
Publication date: 8 November 2021
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-020-03576-x
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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