A new approach to the core and Weber set of multichoice games
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Publication:2465381
DOI10.1007/s00186-007-0159-8zbMath1154.91303OpenAlexW2106234894MaRDI QIDQ2465381
Publication date: 4 January 2008
Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-007-0159-8
Related Items (13)
Characterizations of solutions for games with precedence constraints ⋮ A constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games ⋮ The core of bicapacities and bipolar games ⋮ Cost allocation in energy distribution networks ⋮ Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem ⋮ Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game? ⋮ The precore: converse consistent enlargements and alternative axiomatic results ⋮ The restricted core of games on distributive lattices: how to share benefits in a hierarchy ⋮ The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games ⋮ A Hierarchical Model for Cooperative Games ⋮ Convex multi-choice games: characterizations and monotonic allocation schemes ⋮ Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation ⋮ Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games
Cites Work
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- The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints
- Ternary voting games
- Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games. I
- Games on lattices, multichoice games and the Shapley value: a new approach
- Cores of games with restricted cooperation
- Lectures on Polytopes
- Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
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