Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.003zbMath1471.91378OpenAlexW3155927174MaRDI QIDQ2236191

Kevin Techer

Publication date: 22 October 2021

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

coreexternalityliability rulesmulti-choice cooperative game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Mathematical economics (91B99)

Related Items

Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games

Cites Work

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