Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2021.04.003zbMATH Open1471.91378OpenAlexW3155927174MaRDI QIDQ2236191FDOQ2236191

Authors: Kevin Techer 

Publication date: 22 October 2021

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.003

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zbMATH Keywords

coreexternalityliability rulesmulti-choice cooperative game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Mathematical economics (91B99)

Cites Work

• A new approach to the core and Weber set of multichoice games
• Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games. I
• Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games
• Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games
• The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games
• Confining the Coase theorem: contracting, ownership, and free-riding
• The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Detrimental externalities, pollution rights, and the ``Coase theorem
• Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation
• The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game
• Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility

Cited In (3)

• Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games
• The identity of the generator in the problem of social cost
• Optimal liability rules under mutual externalities among multiagents

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