Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games
The Shapley value for multi-choice cooperative games is an extension of the traditional symmetric Shapely value. If we restrict each player in a multichoice game to have only one action which is not dummy, then we can see that the extended Shapley value is also an extension of the weighted Shapley value. The authors showed that the extended Shapley value has both monotonicity and dummy free properties. Any solution without these two properties is unreasonable. Furthermore, dummy free property is a special case of independence of non-essential players. Recently, we have shown that the extended Shapley value is independent of non-essential players [`Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games', J. Game Theory Econ. Behav., to appear].
- Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3967536 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3591262 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
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- On weighted Shapley values
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- Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games. I
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- The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games
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