The pseudo-average rule: bankruptcy, cost allocation and bargaining
From MaRDI portal
Publication:627454
DOI10.1007/s00186-010-0333-2zbMath1209.49057MaRDI QIDQ627454
Txus Ortells, Juan Carlos Santos
Publication date: 2 March 2011
Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-010-0333-2
balanced contributions; cost allocation; bargaining; bankruptcy; rationing; equal area; claims problem; pseudo-average solution
91A12: Cooperative games
49N90: Applications of optimal control and differential games
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
Related Items
Equal Area Rule to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims, Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update, GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY AND TAXATION PROBLEMS: RECENT ADVANCES
Cites Work
- Cost allocation schemes: An asymptotic approach
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games
- The bankruptcy problem: A cooperative bargaining approach
- Average cost pricing versus serial cost sharing: An axiomatic comparison
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
- On the serial cost sharing rule
- Characterizations of a multi-choice value
- A Shapley value for games with restricted coalitions
- An Introduction to Allocation Rules
- Serial Cost Sharing
- Values of Non-Atomic Games
- A value for multichoice games