The pseudo-average rule: bankruptcy, cost allocation and bargaining

DOI10.1007/s00186-010-0333-2zbMath1209.49057MaRDI QIDQ627454

Txus Ortells, Juan Carlos Santos

Publication date: 2 March 2011

Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-010-0333-2

zbMATH Keywords

balanced contributions; cost allocation; bargaining; bankruptcy; rationing; equal area; claims problem; pseudo-average solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

49N90: Applications of optimal control and differential games

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

Related Items

Equal Area Rule to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims, Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update, GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY AND TAXATION PROBLEMS: RECENT ADVANCES

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