An Axiomatization for Two Power Indices for (3,2)-Simple Games
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Publication:5384711
DOI10.1142/S0219198919400012zbMath1417.91034OpenAlexW2922122445MaRDI QIDQ5384711
Giulia Bernardi, Josep Freixas
Publication date: 25 June 2019
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198919400012
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