Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
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Publication:816503
DOI10.1007/s10479-005-2244-9zbMath1138.91385OpenAlexW2072101383MaRDI QIDQ816503
Publication date: 9 March 2006
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-005-2244-9
Related Items (29)
Three-valued simple games ⋮ Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention ⋮ Hierarchies achievable in simple games ⋮ An Axiomatization for Two Power Indices for (3,2)-Simple Games ⋮ Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity ⋮ Influence relation in two-output multichoice voting games ⋮ A model of influence with a continuum of actions ⋮ Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention ⋮ The Shapley value for bicooperative games ⋮ Biprobabilistic values for bicooperative games ⋮ Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index ⋮ Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories ⋮ Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure ⋮ On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention ⋮ The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games ⋮ Bisemivalues for bicooperative games ⋮ The Banzhaf power index for ternary bicooperative games ⋮ The selectope for bicooperative games ⋮ A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions ⋮ On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval ⋮ Amplitude of weighted representation of voting games with several levels of approval ⋮ Multilinear extensions and values for multichoice games ⋮ Banzhaf index for multiple voting systems. An application to the European Union ⋮ Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval ⋮ SOME OPEN PROBLEMS IN SIMPLE GAMES ⋮ The Italian referendum: what can we get from game theory? ⋮ Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues ⋮ A critical analysis on the notion of power ⋮ Public good indices for games with several levels of approval
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