The Banzhaf power index for ternary bicooperative games

DOI10.1016/J.DAM.2010.02.007MaRDI QIDQ708322zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors N. Jiménez, J. J. López, Jésus Mario Bilbao, J. R. Fernández

Publication date 11 October 2010

Published in Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2010.02.007

zbMATH Keywords

generating functionBanzhaf power indexternary bicooperative game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Ternary voting games
• Normalized pseudo-Banzhaf values for bicooperative games
• Compound voting and the Banzhaf index
• The Shapley-Shubik index, the donation paradox and ternary games
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1599890 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4162686 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3932826 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3983158 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
• Bi-capacities. I: Definition, Möbius transform and interaction
• Bi-capacities. II: The Choquet integral
• Biprobabilistic values for bicooperative games
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Ternary voting games
• The Shapley value for bicooperative games
• The Shapley-Shubik index, the donation paradox and ternary games
• The forgotten decision rules: majority rules based on difference of votes
• Voting power in the European Union enlargement
• Weighted multiple majority games with unions: generating functions and applications to the European Union
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval

Cited in

(6)

• Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues
• The exact lower bound for the Coleman index of the power of a collectivity for a special class of simple majority games
• Some properties for bisemivalues on bicooperative games
• Bisemivalues for bicooperative games
• Normalized pseudo-Banzhaf values for bicooperative games
• Multi- and multi-polar capacities

This page was built for publication: The Banzhaf power index for ternary bicooperative games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q708322)