The Banzhaf power index for ternary bicooperative games

DOI10.1016/J.DAM.2010.02.007zbMATH Open1231.91088OpenAlexW2043734032MaRDI QIDQ708322FDOQ708322

Authors: N. Jiménez, J. J. López, Jésus Mario Bilbao, J. R. Fernández 

Publication date: 11 October 2010

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2010.02.007

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zbMATH Keywords

generating functionBanzhaf power indexternary bicooperative game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• The forgotten decision rules: majority rules based on difference of votes
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
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• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Ternary voting games
• Bi-capacities. I: Definition, Möbius transform and interaction
• Bi-capacities. II: The Choquet integral
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• The Shapley value for bicooperative games
• Weighted multiple majority games with unions: generating functions and applications to the European Union
• Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
• Voting power in the European Union enlargement
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• Biprobabilistic values for bicooperative games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Shapley-Shubik index, the donation paradox and ternary games

Cited In (6)

• Some properties for bisemivalues on bicooperative games
• Normalized pseudo-Banzhaf values for bicooperative games
• Multi- and multi-polar capacities
• Bisemivalues for bicooperative games
• The exact lower bound for the Coleman index of the power of a collectivity for a special class of simple majority games
• Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues

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