Voting power in the European Union enlargement

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(01)00334-4zbMATH Open1073.91539MaRDI QIDQ1848640FDOQ1848640

Authors: N. Jiménez, J. J. López, Jésus Mario Bilbao, J. R. Fernández 

Publication date: 13 November 2002

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games.
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2073358
• Generating functions for computing power indices efficiently
• Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union
• The distribution of power in the European constitution

zbMATH Keywords

Computational complexityGenerating functionPower indices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (26)

• Simple games versus weighted voting games: bounding the critical threshold value
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members
• On the computational complexity of weighted voting games
• The Banzhaf index in complete and incomplete shareholding structures: a new algorithm
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Banzhaf power index for ternary bicooperative games
• Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics
• The dimension for the European Union Council under the Nice rules.
• Dimension of the Lisbon voting rules in the EU council: a challenge and new world record
• Implementing generating functions to obtain power indices with coalition configuration
• Weighted multiple majority games with unions: generating functions and applications to the European Union
• The cost of getting local monotonicity
• Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori?
• The complexity of power indexes with graph restricted coalitions
• The distribution of power in the European constitution
• Spectrum value for coalitional games
• Some open problems in simple games
• A linear approximation method for the Shapley value
• The \(cg\)-position value for games on fuzzy communication structures
• Three-valued simple games
• Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union
• Pseudo polynomial size LP formulation for calculating the least core value of weighted voting games
• Preferences, the agenda setter, and the distribution of power in the EU
• Computing power indices for large voting games
• Monte Carlo methods for the Shapley-Shubik power index

This page was built for publication: Voting power in the European Union enlargement

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1848640)