Voting power in the European Union enlargement

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(01)00334-4MaRDI QIDQ1848640zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors N. Jiménez, J. J. López, Jésus Mario Bilbao, J. R. Fernández

Publication date 13 November 2002

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Computational complexityGenerating functionPower indices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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• The Banzhaf index in complete and incomplete shareholding structures: a new algorithm
• The Banzhaf power index for ternary bicooperative games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5589328 (Why is no real title available?)
• Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics
• The dimension for the European Union Council under the Nice rules.
• Dimension of the Lisbon voting rules in the EU council: a challenge and new world record
• Implementing generating functions to obtain power indices with coalition configuration
• Weighted multiple majority games with unions: generating functions and applications to the European Union
• The cost of getting local monotonicity
• Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori?
• The complexity of power indexes with graph restricted coalitions
• The distribution of power in the European constitution
• Spectrum value for coalitional games
• Some open problems in simple games
• A linear approximation method for the Shapley value
• The cg-position value for games on fuzzy communication structures
• Three-valued simple games
• Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union
• Pseudo polynomial size LP formulation for calculating the least core value of weighted voting games
• Preferences, the agenda setter, and the distribution of power in the EU
• Computing power indices for large voting games
• Monte Carlo methods for the Shapley-Shubik power index

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