On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members
From MaRDI portal
Publication:535276
DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0171-6zbMATH Open1211.91100OpenAlexW1992147986MaRDI QIDQ535276FDOQ535276
Authors: Marc R. Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, J. L. Rouet 
Publication date: 11 May 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00010168/file/Alliance10.pdf
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Multilinear Extensions of Games
- Computing power indices for large voting games
- The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
- L. S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases.
- Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori?
- General exact solution to the problem of the probability density for sums of random variables
Cited In (9)
- Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union
- Powers of subgroups in voting bodies
- Alliance incentives under the D'Hondt method
- A model of influence in a social network
- An angel-daemon approach to assess the uncertainty in the power of a collectivity to act
- The drastic outcomes from voting alliances in three-party democratic voting (1990 \(\rightarrow\) 2013)
- Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori?
- Square root voting system, optimal threshold and \(\pi\)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
This page was built for publication: On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q535276)
