Square root voting system, optimal threshold and

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_30MaRDI QIDQ4644768zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Karol Życzkowski, Wojciech Słomczyński

Publication date 8 January 2019

Published in Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1104.5213

zbMATH Keywords

European unionlarge statemember statesmall statevote system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Abstract: The problem of designing an optimal weighted voting system for the two-tier voting, applicable in the case of the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU), is investigated. Various arguments in favour of the square root voting system, where the voting weights of member states are proportional to the square root of their population are discussed and a link between this solution and the random walk in the one-dimensional lattice is established. It is known that the voting power of every member state is approximately equal to its voting weight, if the threshold q for the qualified majority in the voting body is optimally chosen. We analyze the square root voting system for a generic 'union' of M states and derive in this case an explicit approximate formula for the level of the optimal threshold: q simeq 1/2+1/sqrt{{pi} M}. The prefactor 1/sqrt{{pi}} appears here as a result of averaging over the ensemble of unions with random populations.

Recommendations

• On influence and compromise in two-tier voting systems
• On Penrose's square-root law and beyond
• A mathematical view on voting and power
• Equal representation in two-tier voting systems
• Optimization of decisional power in representational systems with vote binding

Cites work

• Buffon's Noodle Problem
• Geometry of Quantum States
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
• L S Penrose's limit theorem: tests by simulation
• L. S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases.
• Minimizing the mean majority deficit: The second square-root rule
• Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
• On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members
• Riemann-Liouville fractional integration and reduced distributions on hyperspheres
• The distribution of power in the European constitution
• The mathematics and statistics of voting power
• The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
• Voting and collective decision-making. Bargaining and power

Cited in

(12)

• Minimizing the mean majority deficit: The second square-root rule
• Average weights and power in weighted voting games
• Collective bias models in two-tier voting systems and the democracy deficit
• Monte Carlo methods for the Shapley-Shubik power index
• On influence and compromise in two-tier voting systems
• Two-tier voting: measuring inequality and specifying the inverse power problem
• Why not proportional?
• On Penrose's square-root law and beyond
• Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union
• A method of assigning a global preference index
• Testing Penrose limit theorem: a case study of French local data
• The hidden curse of French inter-communal power

This page was built for publication: Square root voting system, optimal threshold and \(\pi\)

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4644768)