Collective bias models in two-tier voting systems and the democracy deficit
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Publication:2082790
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.08.001zbMath1500.91059arXiv2102.12704OpenAlexW3129912065MaRDI QIDQ2082790
Publication date: 4 October 2022
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.12704
limit theoremprobabilistic votingoptimal weightscollective bias modelsdemocracy deficittwo-tier voting systems
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