Welfarist evaluations of decision rules for boards of representatives
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Publication:2464041
DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0246-ZzbMATH Open1180.91088OpenAlexW2032525965MaRDI QIDQ2464041FDOQ2464041
Authors: Claus Beisbart, Luc Bovens
Publication date: 10 December 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0246-z
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Cited In (16)
- Welfarist evaluations of decision rules under interstate utility dependencies
- Voting power: an information theory approach
- Collective bias models in two-tier voting systems and the democracy deficit
- A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting
- Why not proportional?
- Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics
- The wisdom of collective grading and the effects of epistemic and semantic diversity
- Welfare ordering of voting weight allocations
- Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule
- Optimization of decisional power in representational systems with vote binding
- Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
- Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment
- Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives
- Citizen preferences and the architecture of government
- On the justice of decision rules
- Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
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