Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.10.007zbMATH Open1237.91096OpenAlexW2034305032MaRDI QIDQ423073FDOQ423073

Authors: Antonin Macé, Rafael Treibich 

Publication date: 18 May 2012

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.007

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Voting and collective decision-making. Bargaining and power
• Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations
• Welfarist evaluations of decision rules for boards of representatives
• Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives
• Voting power in the governance of the international monetary fund
• European apportionment via the Cambridge compromise
• Why not proportional?
• Mathematical aspects of degressive proportionality

Cited In (3)

• Why not proportional?
• Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
• An optimality-argument for equal weighting

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