PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES
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Publication:2935186
DOI10.1111/iere.12083zbMath1404.91084OpenAlexW1488238968WikidataQ56387585 ScholiaQ56387585MaRDI QIDQ2935186
Publication date: 22 December 2014
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12083
Related Items (13)
Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules ⋮ An experimental study of voting with costly delay ⋮ Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms ⋮ The winner‐take‐all dilemma ⋮ Information aggregation with a continuum of types ⋮ Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view ⋮ Stable constitutions ⋮ The price of `one person, one vote' ⋮ Condorcet meets Bentham ⋮ Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach ⋮ Efficient voting with penalties ⋮ All or nothing: state capacity and optimal public goods provision ⋮ The optimal majority threshold as a function of the variation coefficient of the environment
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