Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
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Publication:3446419
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00737.xzbMath1201.91036OpenAlexW2011920568MaRDI QIDQ3446419
Matthew O. Jackson, Hugo Sonnenschein
Publication date: 14 June 2007
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00737.x
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