On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design

DOI10.1287/opre.2021.2122zbMath1484.91109OpenAlexW3203719940MaRDI QIDQ5031660

Anthony Kim, Daniel J. Russo, Santiago R. Balseiro

Publication date: 16 February 2022

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2122

zbMATH Keywords

minimax regretdynamic pricingstrategic learningrobust mechanism designdynamic contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Robust screening under ambiguity
• Robust monopoly pricing
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
• Robust mechanisms: the curvature case
• Sequential Screening
• Dynamic Pricing Without Knowing the Demand Function: Risk Bounds and Near-Optimal Algorithms
• Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights
• Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• Dynamic Incentive-Aware Learning: Robust Pricing in Contextual Auctions
• Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism
• An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

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