Robust screening under ambiguity

DOI10.1007/s10107-016-1063-xzbMath1365.90267OpenAlexW2514858667MaRDI QIDQ526838

Can Kızılkale, Mustafa Çelebi Pinar

Publication date: 15 May 2017

Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/36365

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguityrobust optimizationpricingmechanism designscreening

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Minimax problems in mathematical programming (90C47) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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