Mechanism design with maxmin agents: Theory and an application to bilateral trade
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Publication:4586060
DOI10.3982/TE2089zbMath1395.91241OpenAlexW2187265857MaRDI QIDQ4586060
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2089
Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)
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