Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.004zbMATH Open1422.91036OpenAlexW3125614942MaRDI QIDQ1753675FDOQ1753675

Vivek Bhattacharya, Ludwig Straub, Lucas Manuelli

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.004

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zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesambiguity aversionlinearityimperfect public monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Ambiguity aversion, games against nature, and dynamic consistency
• Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: Breaking down backward induction
• Equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty
• Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players
• Calibrated incentive contracts
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Learning from private information in noisy repeated games
• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown
• The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• Mechanism design with maxmin agents: Theory and an application to bilateral trade

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