Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.004MaRDI QIDQ1753675zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vivek Bhattacharya, Lucas Manuelli, Ludwig Straub

Publication date 29 May 2018

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.004

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesambiguity aversionlinearityimperfect public monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
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Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Ambiguity aversion, games against nature, and dynamic consistency
• Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
• Calibrated incentive contracts
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty
• Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Learning from private information in noisy repeated games
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
• Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade
• Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: Breaking down backward induction
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• Repeated games where the payoffs and monitoring structure are unknown
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The design of ambiguous mechanisms
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

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