Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.02.011zbMATH Open1400.91050OpenAlexW2592261144MaRDI QIDQ2397641FDOQ2397641

Marie Laclau, Tristan Tomala

Publication date: 23 May 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.011

Recommendations

• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers
• Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation.
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesapproachabilitypublic monitoringpure strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
• Finitely Repeated Games
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation.
• On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games
• The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information

Cited In (10)

• The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Finitely repeated games with monitoring options
• Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
• Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
• Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
• Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
• Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient

This page was built for publication: Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2397641)