Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.011zbMath1400.91050OpenAlexW2592261144MaRDI QIDQ2397641

Marie Laclau, Tristan Tomala

Publication date: 23 May 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.011

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesapproachabilitypublic monitoringpure strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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