Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.02.011MaRDI QIDQ2397641zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marie Laclau, Tristan Tomala

Publication date 23 May 2017

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.011

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesapproachabilitypublic monitoringpure strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592673 (Why is no real title available?)
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games
• Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
• Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation.
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(19)

• Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
• An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
• Repeated games where the payoffs and monitoring structure are unknown
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620865 (Why is no real title available?)
• Finitely repeated games with monitoring options
• Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
• Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
• Games on graphs with a public signal monitoring
• Transforming monitoring structures with resilient encoders -- application to repeated games
• Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
• Attaining efficiency with imperfect public monitoring and one-sided Markov adverse selection
• Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers
• Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
• Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
• Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion
• Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient

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