Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.12.004zbMath1141.91328OpenAlexW2269158136MaRDI QIDQ931784

Jérôme Renault, Sergio Scarlatti, Marco Scarsini

Publication date: 26 June 2008

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/3132/1/mindiscount20071212.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesdiscount factorimperfect monitoringPareto-efficiencyprivate equilibriapublic equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ Perfect information games where each player acts only once ⋮ General properties of long-run supergames ⋮ Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring

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