Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
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Publication:3693309
DOI10.2307/1911017zbMath0574.90100OpenAlexW2143018197MaRDI QIDQ3693309
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/8d209a2fc63d622a2838458832991c031cb68a45
Nash equilibriumdiscountinglong-run average expected utilityrepeated principal-agent gamesupergame equilibrium
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