Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency

DOI10.1007/BF01213620zbMATH Open0815.90036MaRDI QIDQ1341508FDOQ1341508

Authors: P. Dutta, Roy Radner 

Publication date: 14 June 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardbankruptcy contractsrepeated principal-agent situation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Existence of Optimal Stochastic Control Laws
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A law of large numbers in the theory of consumer's choice under uncertainty
• Linear models of economic survival under production uncertainty
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency
• Bankruptcy and expected utility maximization
• Minimizing or Maximizing the Expected Time to Reach Zero
• A decomposition of the Brownian path
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models

Cited In (15)

• The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations
• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
• Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
• Risk vs. profit potential:
• A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard
• Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency
• Bankruptcy and expected utility maximization
• Optimal sickness benefits in a principal-agent model
• The principal-agent problem for service rate event-dependency
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models
• Asymptotic efficiency in dynamic principal-agent problems
• Theory of dynamic portfolio for survival under uncertainty
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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