Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency

DOI10.1007/BF01213620zbMath0815.90036MaRDI QIDQ1341508

Prajit K. Dutta, Roy Radner

Publication date: 14 June 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardbankruptcy contractsrepeated principal-agent situation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency ⋮ Risk vs. profit potential: ⋮ Theory of dynamic portfolio for survival under uncertainty ⋮ Bankruptcy and expected utility maximization

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