A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard

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Cites work

(Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
A homotopy interior point method for semi-infinite programming problems
A new exact penalty method for semi-infinite programming problems
A Semi-Infinite Programming Model In Data Envelopment Analysis
A standard branch-and-bound approach for nonlinear semi-infinite problems
A trust region method for semi-infinite programming problems
An interior point sequential quadratic programming-type method for log-determinant semi-infinite programs
An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
Asymptotic approximation method and its convergence on semi-infinite programming
Augmented lagrangians in semi-infinite programming
Designing insurance markets with moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
Discretization methods for the solution of semi-infinite programming problems
Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
Generalized semi-infinite programming: numerical aspects
Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2222641 (Why is no real title available?)
Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory
Robot trajectory planning with semi-infinite programming.
Semi-infinite programming
Semismooth Newton methods for solving semi-infinite programming problems
The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I

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